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Abstract 1 
Intuitively, how we feel about potential outcomes will determine our decisions. Indeed, one 2 
of the most influential theories in psychology, Prospect Theory, implicitly assumes that 3 
feelings govern choice. Surprisingly, however, we know very little about the rules by which 4 
feelings are transformed into decisions. Here, we characterize a computational model that 5 
uses feelings to predict choice. We reveal that this model predicts choice better than existing 6 
value-based models, showing a unique contribution of feelings to decisions, over and above 7 
value. Similar to Prospect Theory value function, feelings showed diminished sensitivity to 8 
outcomes as value increased. However, loss aversion in choice was explained by an 9 
asymmetry in how feelings about losses and gains were weighed when making a decision, not 10 
by an asymmetry in the feelings themselves. The results provide new insights into how 11 
feelings are utilized to reach a decision. 12 
Keywords: decision-making, feelings, subjective well-being, value, utility, Prospect Theory 13 
14 
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Introduction 15 
How would you feel if you received international recognition for outstanding professional 16 
achievement? How would you feel if your marriage broke apart? Intuitively, answers to these 17 
questions are important, as they should predict your actions. If the prospect of losing your 18 
spouse does not fill you with negative feelings you may not attempt to keep the unit intact. 19 
But how exactly do feelings associated with possible outcomes relate to actual choices? What 20 
are the computational rules by which feelings are transformed into decisions? While an 21 
expanding body of literature has been dedicated to answering the reverse question, namely 22 
how decision outcomes affect feelings (Carter & McBride, 2013; Kassam, Morewedge, 23 
Gilbert, & Wilson, 2011; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006; McGraw, Larsen, 24 
Kahneman, & Schkade, 2010; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Rutledge, Skandali, 25 
Dayan, & Dolan, 2014; Yechiam, Telpaz, & Hochman, 2014), little is known of how feelings 26 
drive decisions about potential outcomes.  27 
Here, we examine whether feelings predict choice and built a computational model that 28 
characterizes this relationship. We turned to Prospect Theory (Fox & Poldrack, 2014; 29 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 1992) as a starting point in this 30 
endeavor. Prospect Theory was not derived by eliciting people’s feelings to predict choice, 31 
but rather by observing people’s choices in order to estimate the subjective value associated 32 
with possible outcomes. An implicit assumption of the theory, however, is that subjective 33 
value (utility) is a proxy for feelings, which in turn govern choice; “humans described by 34 
Prospect Theory are guided by the immediate emotional impact of gains and losses” 35 
(Kahneman, 2011). This suggests that if we measure a person’s feelings associated with 36 
different outcomes, we should be able to generate that person’s utility function and use it to 37 
predict their choices. While Prospect Theory is one of the most influential theories in 38 
economics and psychology, this implicit assumption has never been empirically tested. Thus, 39 
we do not know if and how feelings guide choice. 40 
To address this question, in two separate studies (see Supplemental Material for replication 41 
study), participants reported how they felt, or expected to feel, after winning or losing 42 
different amounts of money. We used those self-reported feelings to form a “feeling 43 
function”; a function that best relates feelings (expected and/or experienced) to objective 44 
value.  Next, we used this function to predict participants’ choices in a different decision-45 
making task. Our findings were replicated in both studies. 46 
Models of affective decision-making 
 4 
An intriguing question is what such a “feeling function” would look like. One possibility is 47 
that it resembles Prospect Theory’s value function, which relates the subjective value 48 
estimated from choice data to objective value. First, for most people, the value function is 49 
steeper for losses in comparison to gains. This results in loss aversion, such that the absolute 50 
subjective value of losing a dollar is greater than that of winning a dollar. Yet, while losses 51 
appear to “loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), we do not know whether 52 
the impact of a loss on our feelings is greater than the impact of an equivalent gain. 53 
Alternatively, it is possible that the impact of gains and losses on feelings is similar, but that 54 
the weight given to those feelings differs when making a choice. Second, Prospect Theory’s 55 
value function is convex in the loss domain while concave in the gain domain (resembling an 56 
“S-shape”). The curvature of the function in both domains represents the notion of 57 
diminishing sensitivity to changes in value as gains and losses increase. In other words, the 58 
subjective value of gaining (or losing) ten dollars is smaller than twice that of gaining (or 59 
losing) five dollars. This diminishing sensitivity results in risk aversion in the gain domain 60 
and risk seeking in the loss domain, with individuals tending to choose a small sure gain over 61 
a high but risky gain, but a high risky loss over a small sure loss. We examined whether our 62 
“feeling function” was also concave for gains and convex for losses, implying that similar to 63 
value, feelings associated with gains and losses are less sensitive to outcome value as gains 64 
and losses increase. That is, the impact of winning (or losing) ten dollars on feelings is less 65 
than twice the impact of winning (or losing) five dollars. 66 
Once feelings were modeled using this “feeling function” we asked whether they can predict 67 
choice. Understanding how explicit feelings relate to behavior has important real-world 68 
implications for domains ranging from policy to industry.  69 
 70 
Methods 71 
Subjects. Fifty-nine healthy volunteers were recruited to take part in the experiment via the 72 
UCL Subject Pool. Sample size was determined using a power analysis (G*power version 73 
3.1.9.2; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Based on previous studies that have 74 
investigated the link between decision outcomes and self-report feelings using within-75 
subjects designs, effect sizes (Cohen’s dz) ranged from .245 to .798, with a mean at .401 76 
(Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Mersmann, 2007; Kermer et al., 2006; Yechiam et al., 77 
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2014). A sample size of 59 subjects was therefore required to achieve 85% power of 78 
detecting an effect size of .401 with an alpha of 0.05. Data collection was therefore stopped 79 
after 59 subjects. Three subjects were excluded: one who showed no variation at all in their 80 
feelings ratings, one whose data from the gambling task were lost, and one who missed more 81 
than 50% of the trials in the gambling task. Final analyses were run on 56 subjects (22 males, 82 
mean age 23.9y, age range 19-35y). With 56 subjects included, our post-hoc power to detect 83 
a .401 effect size was still 83.8%. All participants gave written informed consent and were 84 
paid for their participation. The study was approved by the departmental ethics committee at 85 
University College London. 86 
Behavioral tasks. Participants completed two tasks, the order of which was counterbalanced.  87 
1. Feelings Task. In the feelings task, subjects completed 4 blocks of 40 to 48 trials each, in 88 
which they reported either expected (Fig. 1A) or experienced (Fig. 1B) feelings associated 89 
with a range of wins and losses (between £0.2 and £12), or no change in monetary amount 90 
(£0). At the beginning of each trial participants were told how much was at stake and whether 91 
it was a win trial (e.g., if you choose the “good” picture, you will win £10) or a loss trial (e.g., 92 
if you choose the “bad” picture, you will lose £10). Their task was then to make a simple 93 
arbitrary choice between two geometrical shapes, associated with a 50% chance of winning 94 
versus not winning (on win trials) or of losing versus not losing (on loss trials). On each trial 95 
one novel stimulus was randomly associated with a gain or loss (between £0.2 and £12) and 96 
the other novel stimulus with no gain and no loss (£0). Each stimulus was presented once so 97 
learning was not possible. There was no way for the participants to know which abstract 98 
stimulus was associated with a better outcome. They reported their feelings by answering the 99 
questions “How do you feel now?” (experienced feelings, after a choice) or “How do you 100 
think you will feel if you win/lose/don’t win/don’t lose?” (expected feelings, before a 101 
choice), using a subjective rating scale ranging from “Extremely unhappy” to “Extremely 102 
happy”. In 2 of the 4 blocks (counterbalanced order) they reported their expected feelings 103 
(Fig. 1A), and in the other 2 blocks, they reported their experienced feelings (Fig 1B). 104 
Expected and experienced feelings were collected in different blocks to avoid subjects simply 105 
remembering and repeating the same rating. The choice between the two geometrical shapes 106 
was simply instrumental and implemented in order to have subjects actively involved with 107 
the outcomes.  108 
 109 
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 110 
 111 
Fig. 1. Experimental design. Participants completed two tasks in a counterbalanced order 112 
(A,B): a feelings task where they reported (in different blocks) expected (A) or experienced 113 
(B) feelings associated with winning, losing, not winning or not losing a range of monetary 114 
amounts; and (C) a gambling task where they selected between a sure option and a gamble 115 
involving the same amounts as those used in the feelings task. Feelings were modeled as a 116 
function of value and this resulting feelings function F was used to predict choice in the 117 
gambling task. For each trial, feelings associated with the sure option, the risky gain, and the 118 
risky loss were extracted and entered in a cross-trials within-subject logistic regression 119 
model. 120 
 121 
2. Gambling Task. Participants completed a probabilistic choice task (Fig. 1C) in which they 122 
made 288-322 choices between a risky 50/50 gamble and a sure option. Importantly, all the 123 
amounts used in the gambling task were the same as those used in the feelings task (between 124 
£0.2 and £12), such that feelings associated with these outcomes could be combined to 125 
predict gamble choice. There were 3 gamble types: mixed (subjects had to choose between a 126 
gamble with 50% chance of a gain and 50% of a loss, or sure option of £0), gain-only 127 
(subjects had to choose between a gamble with 50% chance of a high gain and 50% chance of 128 
£0, or a sure, smaller, gain) and loss-only (subjects had to choose between a gamble with 129 
50% chance of a high loss and 50% chance of £0, or a sure, smaller, loss). In Prospect 130 
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Theory, these 3 types of choices are essential to estimate loss aversion, risk preference for 131 
gains, and risk preference for losses, respectively. 132 
Subjects started the experiment with an initial endowment of £12 and were paid according to 133 
their choices on two randomly chosen trials (across both tasks) at the end of the experiment. 134 
Feelings function models. The impact of outcome on feelings was calculated relative to 135 
three different baselines: difference from the mid-point of the rating scale, difference from 136 
rating reported on the previous trial (for experienced feelings only), difference from 137 
corresponding zero outcome. These were calculated for each win and loss amount, for 138 
expected and experienced feelings separately. For each subject, for each of the above 139 
methods, feelings function models were then fit (ten for expected feelings and ten for 140 
experienced feelings) to explain how feelings best relate to value outcomes: 141 
Feeling Model 1:   𝐹(𝑥) =  𝜷𝑥 142 
Feeling Model 2:   𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝑥,    𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔𝑥,      𝑥 < 0
 143 
Feeling Model 3:   𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷(|𝑥|)𝝆,      𝑥 > 0
−𝜷(|𝑥|)𝝆,     𝑥 < 0
 144 
Feeling Model 4:   𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏(|𝑥|)
𝝆,      𝑥 > 0
−𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔(|𝑥|)
𝝆,     𝑥 < 0
 145 
Feeling Model 5:   𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷(|𝑥|)𝝆𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 ,      𝑥 > 0
−𝜷(|𝑥|)𝝆𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 ,     𝑥 < 0
 146 
Feeling Model 6:   𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏(|𝑥|)
𝝆𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 ,      𝑥 > 0
−𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔(|𝑥|)
𝝆𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 ,     𝑥 < 0
 147 
Feeling Model 7:   𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷𝑥 +  𝜺,    𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝑥 − 𝜺,      𝑥 < 0
 148 
Feeling Model 8:   𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝑥 + 𝜺,    𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔𝑥 − 𝜺,      𝑥 < 0
 149 
Feeling Model 9:   𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷𝑥 +  𝜺𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏,    𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝑥 − 𝜺𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔,      𝑥 < 0
 150 
Feeling Model 10:   𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏𝑥 + 𝜺𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏,    𝑥 > 0
𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔𝑥 − 𝜺𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔,      𝑥 < 0
 151 
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In all these models, 𝑥 represents the value (from -12 to -0.2 for losses and from 0.2 to 12 for 152 
gains) and 𝐹 the associated feeling. The slope between feelings and values is represented by 153 
the parameter 𝜷 estimated as a single parameter in all odd-numbered models, or separately 154 
for losses and gains in all even-numbered models. If loss aversion is reflected in feelings, 155 
𝜷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔 should be significantly greater than 𝜷𝒈𝒂𝒊𝒏 and even-numbered models should perform 156 
better overall. Similar to the curvature parameter of Prospect Theory value function, 𝝆 157 
reflects the curvature of the feeling function, i.e. the fact that feelings become more or less 158 
sensitive to changes in value as absolute value increases (Feeling Models 3 to 6). In Feeling 159 
Models 5 and 6, the curvature is estimated separately in the gain and loss domains. If the 160 
feeling function is S-shaped (function concave for gains and convex for losses) 𝝆 values 161 
should be significantly smaller than 1. To ensure that a function with curvature fit the feelings 162 
data better than a simple linear function with an intercept, Feeling Models 7 to 10 were 163 
defined (as respective comparisons for Feeling Models 3 to 6), where ε represents the 164 
intercept, or the offset (positive for gains, negative for losses) where feelings start for values 165 
close to £0. All these models were estimated in Matlab (www.mathworks.com) using a 166 
maximum-likelihood estimation procedure (Myung, 2003). Bayesian Information Criterion 167 
(BIC) were calculated for each subject and model, and then summed across subjects (see 168 
Supplemental Material for details). Lower sum of BICs for a given model compared to 169 
another indicates better model fit.   170 
Prediction of gambling choice. Feelings values from Feeling Model 3 (found to be the most 171 
parsimonious model overall) were then used to predict choices in the gambling task. 172 
Specifically, for each participant, the feeling associated with each amount was calculated 173 
using Feeling Model 3 with that participant’s estimated parameters (𝜷 and 𝝆). Thus, for each 174 
trial of the gambling task, a feelings value was obtained for the sure option, the gain and the 175 
loss presented on that trial. A feelings value of 0 was used when the amount in the gamble 176 
trial was £0. The probability of choosing the gamble on each trial, coded as 1 if the gamble 177 
was chosen and 0 if the sure option was chosen, was then entered as the dependent variable of 178 
a logistic regression (Choice Model), with feelings associated with the sure option (𝑆, coded 179 
negatively in order to obtain a positive weight), the gain (𝐺, multiplied by its probability 0.5), 180 
and the loss (𝐿, multiplied by its probability 0.5) entered as the 3 predictor variables: 181 
𝑃(𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒) =
1
1 + 𝑒−[𝝎𝑺𝐹(𝑆)+𝝎𝑮𝐹(𝐺)+𝝎𝑳𝐹(𝐿)]
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Logistic regressions were run on Matlab using the glmfit function, using either expected 182 
feelings (Choice Model 1) or experienced feelings (Choice Model 2). To determine whether 183 
those modeled feelings predicted choice better than value-based models, 5 other comparisons 184 
models were used to predict choice from values (Choice Models 3 to 7; see Supplemental 185 
Material for details). 186 
In order to be compared across conditions and subjects, weight values 𝜔 were standardized 187 
using the following equation: 188 
𝜔𝑥
′ = 𝜔𝑥
𝑠𝑥
𝑠𝑦
 
where 𝜔𝑥
′  is the standardized weight value, 𝜔𝑥 the original weight for predictor variable 𝑥 189 
obtained from the regression, 𝑠𝑥 the standard deviation of variable 𝑥, and 𝑠𝑦 the standard 190 
deviation of the dependent variable 𝑦, here the binary choice values. Standardized weight 191 
values were extracted from each regression and compared using repeated-measures ANOVA 192 
and paired t-tests. 193 
Replication and extension study. A separate study was conducted to replicate the findings 194 
and extend them to cases where the impact of a loss and a gain on feelings is evaluated within 195 
the same trial. See Supplemental Material for details and results. 196 
 197 
Results 198 
Our analysis followed two main steps. First we used participants’ reported feelings associated 199 
with different monetary outcomes to build a “feeling function”. Specifically, we found the 200 
best fitting computational model to characterize how feelings associated with different 201 
amounts of gains and losses relate to the objective value of these amounts. Second, we tested 202 
whether that model of feelings predicted participants’ choices on a separate task. Results of 203 
the main study are reported below and results of the replication study in the Supplemental 204 
Material. 205 
Characterizing a “feeling function” 206 
Feelings associated with losses and gains were elicited using one of two different scales and 207 
the impact of losses and gains on feelings were computed using three different methods (see 208 
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Supplemental Material for details): as the change from the mid-point of the rating scale, as 209 
the change from the previous rating, and as the change from the rating associated with zero 210 
outcome (i.e., the rating associated with not winning or not losing the equivalent amount). 211 
For all the models described below the latter baseline resulted in the best fit (Table S1). Thus 212 
we report results using this baseline.  213 
We aimed to characterize a model that best fit feelings to outcome value. To that end, for 214 
each subject ten models (see Methods for equations) were run to fit data of expected feelings 215 
to outcome value and ten equivalent models to fit experienced feelings to outcome value. The 216 
models differed from each other in two ways. First, in some models the slope of the function, 217 
which indicates how much feelings change for each unit gained/lost, was represented by one 218 
parameter (𝛽) and in others by two parameters; one for gains (𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛) and one for losses 219 
(𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠). If the latter set of models fit better, that would indicate that gains and losses affect 220 
feelings to different extents; if the former set does better that would indicate no difference in 221 
the magnitude of influence. Second, models differed with respects to the curvature of the 222 
function (𝜌). Some models allowed for ρ, some allowed for different curvatures in the loss 223 
(𝜌𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) and gain (𝜌𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛) domains, while others did not allow for a curvature at all but rather 224 
were linear models with either one intercept (𝜀) or two intercepts (𝜀𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛, 𝜀𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠). If models with 225 
a curvature (𝜌) fit better than linear models with an intercept (𝜀) that would suggest that 226 
feelings do not increase linearly as a function of outcome value, but that their sensitivity 227 
varies as outcomes increase, such that the feeling of winning/losing £10 is more or less 228 
intense than twice the feeling of winning/losing £5. Models were estimated using a 229 
maximum-likelihood estimation procedure (see Methods for details). Bayesian Information 230 
Criterion (BIC), which penalises for additional parameters, showed that the best fitting model 231 
(i.e. the lowest BIC value) for both expected (Fig. 2A) and experienced (Fig. 2B) feelings 232 
was Feeling Model 3 (see Table S2 for BIC and R
2
 values), which has one ρ and one β:  233 
𝐹(𝑥) = {
𝜷(|𝑥|)𝝆, 𝑥 > 0
−𝜷(|𝑥|)𝝆, 𝑥 < 0
         (1) 234 
where x is the gain/loss amount (positive for gains and negative for losses) and F the 235 
corresponding feeling.  236 
 237 
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 238 
Fig. 2. Feeling Models. BIC values, summed across all subjects, are plotted for ten models 239 
fitting feelings to outcome value (see Methods for equations), separately for (A) Expected 240 
feelings ratings and (B) Experienced feelings ratings. Feeling Model 3 was the most 241 
parsimonious model, as indicated by lower BIC values for both expected and experienced 242 
feelings. 243 
 244 
This suggests that: 245 
(i) feelings’ sensitivity to outcomes gradually decreased as outcomes increase. Similar to 246 
Prospect Theory’s value function, ρ was significantly smaller than 1 (expected feelings: 247 
ρ=.512 ± SD .26, t(55)=-14.05, P<.001, Cohen’s dz=1.88, 95% CI=[.418;.558]; experienced 248 
feelings: ρ=.425 ± SD .23, t(55)=-18.52, P<.001, Cohen’s dz=2.5, 95% CI=[.513;.637]), 249 
indicating that the feeling function was concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss 250 
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domain. Graphically, we can observe in Fig. 3 that the magnitude of feelings associated with 251 
£10 for example was less than twice the magnitude of feelings associated with £5.  252 
(ii) neither sensitivity (β) nor curvature (ρ) differed for gains than losses. Equal sensitivity 253 
suggests that when feelings associated with losses and gains are evaluated separately their 254 
impact is symmetrical, such that losses are not experienced more intensely than gains. On the 255 
surface, these findings contradict the notion of “loss aversion” as proposed by Prospect 256 
Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 1992). However, what 257 
we will show later is that while losses do not necessarily impact feelings more than gains they 258 
are weighted to a greater extent when making a choice (see Results section on pg 16). With 259 
regards to curvature, a single ρ was more parsimonious than two separate ones for gains and 260 
losses, suggesting that the extent of concavity for gains was equivalent to the extent of 261 
convexity for losses. 262 
Further support for point (i) came from the fact that all models with a curvature parameter ρ 263 
(Feeling Models 3-6) were better fits, as indicated by lower BIC values, than corresponding 264 
linear models with an intercept (Feeling Models 7-10). This was true both when comparing 265 
BICs for models fitting expected feelings (BIC difference < -112) and experienced feelings 266 
(BIC difference < -37) (Table S2). Further support for point (ii) came from the fact that 267 
Feeling Model 3 had lower BICs than other curved functions with additional parameters that 268 
fit gains and losses with separate parameters (Feeling Models 4-6, see Table S3) for both 269 
expected and experienced feelings. In addition, the absolute impact of losses and gains on 270 
ratings of feelings relative to a zero outcome revealed no difference (F(1,55)=0.01, P=0.92, 271 
ηp
2
=.00018). 272 
Impact bias increases with the amount at stake 273 
Interestingly, comparing the functions for experienced and expected feelings revealed an 274 
“impact bias” that increased with amounts lost/gained. The “impact bias” is the tendency to 275 
expect losses/gains to impact our feelings more than they actually do (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, 276 
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). Specifically, the curvature (ρ) was smaller for experienced 277 
feeling function relative to expected feeling function (paired t-test: t(55)=3.31, P=0.002, 278 
Cohen’s dz=.442, 95% CI=[.034;.138]), while there was no difference in sensitivity values (β) 279 
(t(55)=0.65, P=0.52, Cohen’s dz=.087, 95% CI=[-.079;.155]). Thus, although both expected 280 
and experienced feelings became less sensitive to outcomes as absolute values of loss/gain 281 
increased, this diminished sensitivity was more pronounced in experience than in expectation. 282 
As a result, for small amounts of money gained/lost people’s expectations of how they will 283 
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feel were more likely to align with their experience. However, as amounts gained/lost 284 
increased, people were more likely to overestimate the effect of outcomes on their feelings, 285 
expecting to be affected more by gains and losses than they actually were (i.e., the impact 286 
bias (Gilbert et al., 1998)). Graphically, we can observe the growth of the impact bias in Fig. 287 
3 as the increase in separation between the blue line (experienced feelings) and the more 288 
extreme orange line (expected feelings).   289 
 290 
 291 
 292 
Fig. 3. “Feeling function”. Plotted are expected and experienced feelings ratings averaged 293 
across participants for each outcome value, as well as best fitting Feeling Model 3. Average 294 
beta (𝛽) across participants, which represents the slope of the function, was 0.857 ± SD 0.36 295 
for expected feelings and 0.819 ± SD 0.37 for experienced feelings (paired t-test revealed no 296 
significant difference between them: t(55)=0.65, P=0.52, Cohen’s dz=.087, 95% CI=[-297 
.079;.155]). Average rho (𝜌), which represents the curvature of the function, was 0.512 ± SD 298 
0.26 for expected feelings and 0.425 ± SD 0.23 for experienced feelings. Both 𝜌 values were 299 
significantly smaller than 1 (t(55)>14, P<0.001, Cohen’s dz>1.87), consistent with an S-300 
shaped function and indicating diminishing sensitivity of feelings to increasing outcome 301 
values. 𝜌 was also significantly smaller for experienced relative to expected feelings (paired 302 
t-test: t(55)=3.31, P=0.002, Cohen’s dz=.442, 95% CI=[.034;.138]), suggesting that the 303 
“impact bias” grows with increasing outcomes. Error bars represent SEM.  304 
 305 
 306 
 307 
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Feeling function predicts choice better than value-based models 308 
Once we established a function that fit feelings to outcome value, we turned to the question 309 
of how well those feelings predict choices, in particular how they are combined and weighted 310 
to make a decision.  311 
To answer this question we used the Feeling Model built above from the data recorded in the 312 
first task to predict decisions made in a separate gambling task. To do so we conducted two 313 
logistic regressions for each participant (one using expected feelings – Choice Model 1 – and 314 
one using experienced feelings – Choice Model 2), where choice on the gambling task was 315 
entered as the dependent variable (either 1 if the subject selected the gamble or 0 if the 316 
subject selected the sure option) and feelings (predicted by Feeling Model 3) associated with 317 
the options were entered as the independent variable. Specifically, using the participant’s β 318 
and ρ from Feeling Model 3 we computed the feelings associated with each available option 319 
multiplied by their probability. For example, if a participant was offered a mixed gamble trial 320 
where s/he could either choose a gamble that offered a 50% chance of gaining £10 and a 50% 321 
chance of losing £6 or a sure option of £0, we estimated the feelings associated with these 322 
three elements multiplied by their probability: the feeling associated with gaining £10 323 
[𝐹(£10) = 𝛽 × 10𝜌 × 0.5]; the feeling associated with losing £6 [𝐹(−£6) = 𝛽 × (−6)𝜌 ×324 
0.5] and the feeling associated with getting £0: [𝐹(£0) = 0 × 1 = 0]. These were entered in 325 
the logistic regression to predict choice (Choice Model). Each logistic regression thus 326 
resulted in three weight parameters 𝜔, which reflected the weight assigned to feelings when 327 
making a choice; one for gains (𝜔𝐺), one for losses (𝜔𝐿) and one for sure options (𝜔𝑆).  328 
Importantly, choice models using feelings as predictors (Choice Models 1 and 2) were 329 
compared to five other regression models which predicted choice using: objective values 330 
(Choice Model 3), log of objective values (consistent with standard economics models to 331 
account for the curvature of utility – Choice Model 4), as well as three models derived from 332 
Prospect Theory, where value was weighted for each subject with their loss aversion 333 
parameter (Choice Model 5), risk aversion parameter (Choice Model 6), or both (Choice 334 
Model 7) (see Supplemental Material for more details). To avoid circularity, loss and risk 335 
aversion parameters were estimated using half the choice data, and all regression models 336 
were tested on the other half. 337 
Feelings, extracted either from the expected or experienced feeling function (Choice Models 338 
1 and 2) predicted choice better than all value-based comparison models (Choice Models 3-339 
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7), as indicated by lower BIC scores (Fig. 4A). Mean R
2
 values were also higher for both 340 
models predicting choice from feelings (R
2
=0.31 for both Choice Models 1 and 2) than for 341 
comparison models (0.26<R
2
<0.30 for Choice Models 3-7), thus consistent with the BIC 342 
comparison result. Running the split-half analysis 100 times, with a different way to split the 343 
data on every simulation, revealed that models using feelings predicted choice better than all 344 
5 comparison models in 99 simulations out of 100, thus confirming the reliability of this 345 
finding.  346 
 347 
Fig. 4. Choice Models. Seven logistic regressions (or Choice Models) were run to predict 348 
choices on the gambling task, using either feelings derived from the “feeling function” build 349 
using expected (Choice Model 1) or experienced (Choice Model 2) feelings as predictors, or 350 
using value-based comparison models (Choice Models 3-7). (A) BIC scores summed across 351 
subjects (smaller BIC scores indicate a better fit) show that derived feelings (both expected 352 
and experienced) predict choice significantly better than all other value-based models. (B) 353 
The resulting standardized parameters show that the weight of feelings associated with losses 354 
is largest, followed by the weight of feelings associated with gains, with the weight of 355 
feelings associated with sure options smallest. This suggests that feelings associated with 356 
losses are weighted more than feelings associated with gains. Error bars represent SEM. 357 
Two-tailed paired t-tests: * P<0.05. 358 
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 359 
Feelings associated with losses are weighted more than feelings associated with gains 360 
when making a decision 361 
Are feelings about potential losses and gains given equal weights when we deliberate on a 362 
decision? Our feeling function indicated that the impact of a loss on our feelings was equal to 363 
the impact of an equivalent gain. Yet, while losses and gains may impact explicit feelings 364 
similarly, we find that these feelings are weighted differently when making a choice.  365 
Specifically, 𝜔 parameters from our choice models, which predicted choices from feelings, 366 
revealed a greater weight for feelings associated with losses (𝜔𝐿) relative to gains (𝜔𝐺) in 367 
predicting choice (for expected feelings: t(55)=3.04, P=.004, Cohen’s dz=.406, 95% 368 
CI=[.684;3.33]; for experienced feelings: t(55)=2.93, P=.005, Cohen’s dz=.392, 95% 369 
CI=[.599;3.19]; Fig. 4B). Models that allowed different weights for losses and gains 370 
performed significantly better than models that did not (Table S4).  371 
Follow-up analysis revealed that this was true only in mixed-gamble trials, where losses and 372 
gains are weighted simultaneously, but not when comparing gain-only and loss-only trials, in 373 
which gains and losses are evaluated at different time points (different trials). Specifically, 374 
we ran logistic regressions to predict choice from feelings separately for each trial type, and 375 
then entered weight of feelings parameters into a two (trial type: mixed/non-mixed) by two 376 
(outcome: loss/gain) repeated-measures ANOVA. This revealed a significant interaction 377 
(expected feelings: F(1,55)=6.54, P=.013, ηp
2
=.106; experienced feelings: F(1,55)=7.46, 378 
P=.008, ηp
2
=.119; Fig. S1), driven by a greater weight put on feelings associated with losses 379 
relative to gains during mixed-gamble choices (expected feelings: t(55)=3.66, P=.001, 380 
Cohen’s dz=.489, 95% CI=[1.67;5.71]; experienced feelings: t(55)=2.45, P=.018, Cohen’s 381 
dz=.327, 95% CI=[.91;9.10]) but not during loss- versus gain-only trials (expected feelings: 382 
t(55)=.82, P=.42, Cohen’s dz=.109, 95% CI=[-3.25;7.71]; experienced feelings: t(55)=.79, 383 
P=.43, Cohen’s dz=.105, 95% CI=[-2.75;6.32]). In other words, only when potential losses 384 
and gains are evaluated simultaneously (i.e. in the same gamble) are feelings about losses 385 
weighted more strongly during choice than feelings about gains. Results of our replication 386 
and extension study supported this claim by showing that even when gains and losses are 387 
evaluated in the same trial during the feelings task, their impact on feelings does not differ, 388 
but their weight on gamble choice does (see Supplemental Material for details). 389 
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To further tease apart the asymmetrical use of feelings associated with gains and losses in 390 
shaping choice from the use of value alone, we ran another logistic regression (Choice Model 391 
8, run on all trials regardless of gamble type) in which raw feelings (i.e. reported feelings 392 
relative to baseline rather than those derived from the feeling function) were added as 393 
predictors of choice in the same logistic regression as objective values themselves. This was 394 
done to reveal the weight assigned to feelings in making a choice over and beyond the effect 395 
of value per se, when the two compete. The results showed no difference in the weight 396 
assigned to the value of losses and gains per se (t(55)<1.2, P>.23, Cohen’s dz<.17), only to 397 
the weight assigned to the associated feelings (expected feelings: t(55)=3.59, P=.001, 398 
Cohen’s dz=.479, 95% CI=[1.29;4.55]; experienced feelings: t(55)=2.28, P=.027, Cohen’s 399 
dz=.307, 95% CI=[.197;2.89]). Again, this was only true for mixed gamble choices, not for 400 
gain-only or loss-only trials where neither feelings nor values were weighted differently 401 
between losses and gains (Table S5). This suggests that losses are not weighed differently 402 
from gains; rather feelings associated with losses are weighed differently from feelings 403 
associated with gains, emphasizing the importance of feelings in decision making. 404 
This last conclusion raises the possibility that individual differences in decision-making could 405 
be explained by how people weigh feelings when making a choice. Indeed, using the weights 406 
from the above Choice Model 8 we show that individual differences in both loss aversion and 407 
the propensity to choose gambles were directly correlated with the extent to which feelings 408 
associated with losses were over-weighted compared to gains while controlling for value 409 
(correlation between loss aversion and loss-gain weight difference for expected feelings: 410 
r(56)=0.56, P<0.001; for experienced feelings: r(56)=0.34, P=0.012; correlation between 411 
propensity to gamble and loss-gain weight difference for expected feelings: r(56)=-0.61, 412 
P<0.001; for experienced feelings: r(56)=-0.46, P<0.001; Fig. 5, see Supplementary 413 
Information for loss aversion modeling). Specifically, subjects who weighed feelings 414 
associated with losses more than gains were more loss averse and less likely to gamble.  415 
This set of results suggests that the asymmetric influence of gains and losses on decision-416 
making, as suggested by Prospect Theory, is neither reflected in expected nor experienced 417 
feelings, nor in different weights assigned to value per se, but rather in the extent to which 418 
feelings associated with losses and gains are taken into account when making a decision. 419 
 420 
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 421 
Fig. 5. Individual differences in choice are driven by the relative weights of feelings. 422 
Raw feelings (i.e. reported feelings relative to baseline) and objective values were combined 423 
in the same regression model (Choice Model 8) to examine the extent to which feelings 424 
predict choice while controlling for value. Each regression used either Expected (A,C) or 425 
Experienced (B,D) raw feelings together with objective values of each of the 3 decision 426 
options (Gain, Loss, Sure option), leading to 6 weight parameters in each regression 427 
(𝜔𝐺
𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
, 𝜔𝐿
𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
, 𝜔𝑆
𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
, 𝜔𝐺
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, 𝜔𝐿
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, 𝜔𝑆
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒). The difference between the weight of feelings 428 
about losses (𝜔𝐿
𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
) and the weight of feelings about gains (𝜔𝐺
𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
) was then calculated for 429 
each individual and each regression and plotted against ln Loss Aversion (A,B) (parameter 430 
estimated for each individual from the choice data) and proportion of chosen gambles (C,D). 431 
These correlations indicate that the greater weight a participant puts on feelings associated 432 
with a loss relative to a gain when making a decision, the more loss averse (and less likely to 433 
gamble) they are. Note that loss aversion and propensity to gamble are highly correlated, 434 
therefore correlations in C and D are not independent from A and B, respectively, and are 435 
displayed for illustrations purposes.   436 
 437 
 438 
 439 
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Discussion 440 
The relationship between human feelings and the choices they make has occupied scientists, 441 
policymakers and philosophers for decades. Indeed, in recent years numerous studies have 442 
investigated how decisions and outcomes impact people’s feelings (Carter & McBride, 2013; 443 
Kassam et al., 2011; Kermer et al., 2006; McGraw et al., 2010; Mellers et al., 1997; Rutledge 444 
et al., 2014; Yechiam et al., 2014) and life satisfaction (Boyce, Wood, Banks, Clark, & 445 
Brown, 2013; De Neve et al., 2015). Yet, the equally critical question of how people’s 446 
explicit feelings impact their decisions has been relatively neglected. In this study, we 447 
addressed this important question in a controlled laboratory setting and modeled how feelings 448 
are integrated into decisions. We demonstrated that feelings drive the decisions people make. 449 
However, the rules by which they do so differ from previously assumed. 450 
Feelings were first modeled in a “feeling function” (Feeling Model), which was then used to 451 
predict choices (Choice Model). Our Feeling Model predicted choice better than objective 452 
values, and a unique contribution of feelings in the decision process was demonstrated. The 453 
“feeling function” that best related feelings to value was revealed to be concave for gains and 454 
convex for losses, similar to Prospect Theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 455 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and other non-linear utility functions (Bernoulli, 1954; Fox & 456 
Poldrack, 2014; Stauffer, Lak, & Schultz, 2014; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). This 457 
curvature suggests that explicit feelings, similar to subjective value or utility, show 458 
diminishing sensitivity to outcomes as the value of these outcomes increases (Carter & 459 
McBride, 2013). In other words, the impact of winning or losing ten dollars on feelings is less 460 
than twice that of winning or losing five dollars. 461 
Our Feeling Model also revealed no asymmetry between gains and losses, suggesting that the 462 
impact of a loss on feelings is not necessarily greater than the impact of an equivalent gain. 463 
This was replicated in a separate study extending the symmetrical impact of gains and losses 464 
on feelings to cases where a gain and a loss have to be evaluated at the same time. 465 
Nevertheless, loss aversion was still present in choice, consistent with Prospect Theory. 466 
Importantly, when making a decision a greater weight was put on feelings associated with 467 
losses relative to gains. This finding suggests that losses may not impact feelings more 468 
strongly than gains as previously implied, but rather that feelings about losses are weighted 469 
more when making a choice than feelings about gains. Moreover, the amount by which 470 
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feelings associated with losses are over-weighted relative to gains in making a decision 471 
relates to individual differences in loss aversion and propensity to gamble.  472 
This finding resolves a long-standing puzzle by which loss aversion is often observed in 473 
choice, but not necessary in explicit feelings (Harinck et al., 2007; Kermer et al., 2006; 474 
McGraw et al., 2010; Mellers et al., 1997). We suggest that the asymmetric influence of gains 475 
and losses on decision making, as suggested by Prospect Theory, is not reflected in expected 476 
or experienced feelings directly, neither in different weights assigned to value per se, but in 477 
the extent to which feelings about losses and gains are taken into account when making a 478 
decision. Our result is consistent with the interpretation of an increased attention to losses 479 
(Yechiam & Hochman, 2013). When losses and gains are presented separately they are 480 
experienced in a symmetrical way. However, when they compete for attention, as is the case 481 
in the mixed gambles, people may allocate more attention to the feelings they would derive 482 
from the loss than from the gain, leading them to choose in a loss averse manner. Another 483 
possibility is that people implicitly experience losses to a greater extent than gains (Hochman 484 
& Yechiam, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), but this difference is not exhibited in explicit 485 
reports.  486 
Our findings also provide the first demonstration of an increasing impact bias with value. 487 
Specifically, we found evidence for a general impact bias in feelings (also called affective 488 
forecasting error), where people expect the emotional impact of an event to be greater than 489 
their actual experience (Gilbert et al., 1998; Kermer et al., 2006; Kwong, Wong, & Tang, 490 
2013; Levine, Lench, Kaplan, & Safer, 2013; Morewedge & Buechel, 2013; Wilson & 491 
Gilbert, 2013). Interestingly, this impact bias was not constant, but increased with value. This 492 
was due to a stronger curvature of experienced feelings relative to expected feelings. In other 493 
words, as absolute value increases, sensitivity to value diminished more quickly for 494 
experienced relative to expected feelings. This suggests that as people win or lose more 495 
money, they are more and more biased towards overestimating the emotional impact of these 496 
outcomes.  497 
Our modeling approach provides novel insight into how explicit feelings relate to choice. 498 
Such understanding is both of theoretical importance and has practical implications for 499 
policy-makers, economists and clinicians who often measure explicit feelings to predict 500 
choice (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, & Rees-Jones, 2012, 2014). 501 
  502 
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